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This paper reviews and compares patent pools, intellectual property clearinghouses and 
copyright collectives as systems for promoting efficient access to licensable intellectual 
property in a ‘market for technology’ (Arora et al, 2001). These systems promote 
downstream use of innovations by economizing on search and transaction costs in 
licensing, as well as potentially mitigating the conditions that lead to the ‘tragedy of the 
anti-commons’ and other coordination problems in multilateral licensing. We compare 
and classify different systems in terms of their features, review some existing systems, 
and discuss their economic characteristics.  
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1  Introduction 
Intellectual property (IP) rights are granted to give incentives for undertaking costly 
research and development. Legal institutions such as patents and copyrights reward 
innovation by temporarily restricting competition in the production of the resulting 
goods and services. The number of copyrighted works that exist is difficult to measure 
because registration is not typically required, but Figure 1 shows the number of patents 
granted by the U.S. Patents and Trademarks Office (USPTO) and the number of patent 
applications that were submitted to all three of the USPTO, the European Patent Office 
(EPO) and the Japan Patent Office (JPO) (‘triadic’ patent applications) per year. Both 
data series exhibit an upwards trend over time with average annual growth rates over 
the periods shown of 3.4% and 4.9% respectively.  
 
Figure 1 Patents granted by the USPTO, and the number of patent applications that were 




































































































Granted by the USPTO Triadic Patent Applications
 
Sources: USPTO (2005), OECD (2006). 
 
More recently, there has been significant growth in the information technology and 
communications (ICT) and biotechnology, medical and pharmaceutical (BMP) sectors in 
many countries. Figure 2 shows the number of patents issued by the USPTO and 
applications made to the EPO per year for technologies related to these fields. The 
number of ICT patents has grown relatively steadily, while BMP patents experienced 
rapid growth up to 1997, followed by a period of stagnation and then decline. A similar   3 
trend is observed in Table 1, which shows the number of patents issued by the USPTO to  
five top biotechnology firms.  
 


























































































































































































Sources: USPTO (2005), OECD (2006). The USPTO data were classified into BMP and ICT categories by the 
authors. The classification system used is available from the authors on request.  
 
Table 1 Patents issued to five leading biotech firms by the USPTO, by year of filing. 
  86-90  91-95  96-00  01-05 
Amgen  25  270  374  203 
Genentech  161  733  669  266 
Serono  30  7  3  56 
Biogen  48  115  87  58 
Genzyme  13  119  255  108 
TOTAL  277  1,244  1,388  691 
Sources: The firms are identified from the list of top ten biotech firms at www.researchandmarkets.com,1 and 
patents were found via Google’s patent search, www.google.com/patents/.  
 
In the context of patents, a proliferation of IP rights may result in a ‘patent thicket’ 
(Shapiro, 2001) that can increase costs for downstream activities such as cumulative 
innovation and the development of new products that combine multiple existing 
innovations. For example, the above data indicate that that in the United States there are 
currently more than 300,000 active BMP patents and 500,000 active ICT patents. The 
more existing IP rights that cover a given downstream activity, the higher will be the 
transaction costs associated with licensing. In addition, if the upstream IP rights are 
complementary, potential coordination failures among IP owners can lead to excessively 
high licensing fees. Similar issues exist for downstream users of copyrighted works such 
as radio and television stations that combine multiple copyrighted works to make 
broadcast programs.  
                                                     
1 “The Top 10 Biotechnology Companies”, August 2005. This list identifies UCB-Celltech as the 
fifth firm. However, UCB-Celltech undertakes many other activities in addition to biotechnology, 
thus it was excluded from the table.    4 
Another clear trend in IP has been the growth of licensing. Athreye and Cantwell (2007) 
report that worldwide royalty and license revenues reached almost 80 billion US dollars 
in 2000, up from around 10 billion US dollars in 1983. Significant amounts of licensing 
are also reported by Razgaitis (2005) based on a 2004 survey of 472 firms engaged in 
licensing in the U.S. and Canada. In total, 14.4 billion US dollars of in-licensing 
payments and 9.0 billion US dollars of out-licensing revenues were reported by the firms 
surveyed for 2004. Figure 3 shows the uses of patented innovations reported by the 
holders of more than 9,000 European patents (Giuri & Mariani et al 2007), for different 
types of organization. On average, 10.1% of all patents were either licensed by their 
owner or both used and licensed by the owner. High rates of licensing occur among 
public and private research institutions, universities and other government institutions, 
and small firms. All this data points to ‘markets for technology’ (Arora et al, 2001), where 
innovations are bought and sold, becoming increasingly important in facilitating 
downstream uses of IP.  
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The proliferation of IP rights and growth of licensing is good news in the sense that 
these are broad indicators of growth in innovative activities, which are a key driver of 
economic growth. In addition, licensing IP is a substitute for an innovator doing its own 
production, and some firms may be more efficient at production than others. Thus 
outsourcing of production through licensing may be efficient. On the other hand, a 
situation such as a patent thicket is likely to impose additional costs and inefficiency on   5 
downstream product development and cumulative innovation. For example, 
development of a new genetic diagnostic test typically requires licenses to a number of 
patents on gene sequences and related technologies (Scherer, 2002). The greater the 
number of licenses required, the greater the cost of developing the new test. This paper 
is concerned with ways that these costs can be reduced so that markets for technology 
can function more efficiently. 
 
There is also some evidence that markets for technology do not function as efficiently as 
their participants desire. In an earlier survey, Razgaitis (2004) reported that among 
organizations involved in significant licensing activities, 43% of licensing negotiations 
terminated unsuccessfully. Failure was reported to occur because there were either too 
many parties to the negotiation or because a useful bundle of IP could not be assembled 
in 9% of failed out-licensing negotiations and 12% of failed in-licensing negotiations. 
Among the patents in the PatVal-EU survey, 11% were licensed, and for a further 7% the 
owner was willing to license but had been unable to do so (Gambardella et al, 2007).  
 
In this paper we examine ways to facilitate access to IP in order to reduce the costs and 
inefficiencies identified above. We focus on economic systems that operate through 
market mechanisms, rather than regulatory or legal approaches such as research 
exemptions and compulsory licensing. We will consider two basic types of system: 
patent pools and IP clearinghouses.2 We use the term IP access system as a generic label 
that encompasses both patent pools and clearinghouses. These operate as intermediaries 
in markets for technology and economize on search and transaction costs by aggregating 
information about technologies, as well as promoting economies of scale in licensing and 
negotiation. In some cases they also help to generate more efficient prices for licensing 
complementary IP. Some specific examples include patent pools like the MPEG-2 and 
DVD pools, and clearinghouse businesses like Yet2.com which provide a platform for 
advertising licensable technologies. Our definition of clearinghouses also encompasses 
collective rights management organizations such as copyright collectives. Further 
examples are given in section 3. Our specific objectives are to classify IP access systems, 
compare their organizational and economic features, review existing systems, and 
identify directions for future economic research.  
                                                     
2 Another alternative is the idea of ‘open source’ innovation whereby each innovator licenses 
their innovation to others at no cost, on the condition that licensees use the same kind of license. 
The open source model has found some success in software development. However, much of this 
success has been due to the efforts of individual programmers who have a range of personal 
motivations for participating. It is more difficult to see how the same model could be widely 
applied in the field of biotechnology, for example, where development costs are large, and many 
of the innovators are profit-driven firms. See Hope (2004) for a discussion of open source in the 
context of biotechnology.   6 
Some similar issues are discussed by Shapiro (2001), who considers the strategies that 
firms may employ to reduce the effects of a patent thicket on their ability to innovate. 
Shapiro considers the strategies of cross licensing, patent pools, and cooperative 
standard setting. Our paper is complementary to Shapiro’s in that our analysis is at the 
level of the market for technology, rather than an individual firm. We also consider IP 
clearinghouses that operate independently from the innovating firms, and focus on 
systems that could be centralized and operated by a third-party, so we exclude cross 
licensing. There is also an extensive economic literature on the incentives of innovators 
to license intellectual property, and the optimal licensing contracts to use if they choose 
to do so.3 In this paper we take the decision about whether or not to license as given, and 
focus on market mechanisms that bring licensors and licensees together.  
 
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. The next section discusses the 
effects of a proliferation of IP rights on economic efficiency in markets for technology. 
Section 3 describes the general characteristics of an IP access system, their classification, 
and specific features of the systems discussed in this paper. Section 4 then compares the 
economic features of different systems and the effects on markets for technology. Section 
5 concludes and suggests directions for future research.  
 
2  Economic Effects of IP Proliferation 
Arora et al (2001) discuss the idea of a ‘market for technology’, where innovations 
available for licensing are supplied by innovators and where licensing transactions occur. 
We use this framework to analyze the effects of IP proliferation and the impact that IP 
access systems have on the downstream use of licensed innovations.  
 
Figure 4 summarizes the basic conceptual framework, for the case of downstream 
product development. Upstream, innovations available for licensing are supplied into 
the market for technology. Demand for licenses comes from firms that produce final 
goods sold to consumers. The prices of licenses are determined in this market, which 
affect both the costs of producers and the revenues of innovators. Producers then supply 
products to meet demand from final consumers. The prices determined in the product 
markets affect the revenues of producers and the expenditure (and hence welfare) of the 
final consumers. Although for illustration we show innovators and producers as 
separate, in some cases they may be vertically integrated. Figure 4 depicts the case 
where licensed innovations are used to produce final goods and services. Alternatively, 
licenses may be used to produce cumulative innovations. If the cumulative innovation is 
                                                     
3 For example, Gallini and Wright (1990), Kamien and Tauman (1986), Katz and Shapiro (1985), 
and Arora and Fosfuri (2003).    7 
sold to final consumers, then the situation is essentially the same as shown in the figure. 
If the cumulative innovation is itself licensed for downstream use, then it will be sold in 
the market for technology. 
 
Figure 4 Relationships between markets for technology and downstream product markets.  
 
 
In general, the more IP rights that exist within a given field, the greater the potential 
supply of licensable innovations and the greater the range of downstream products that 
can be produced. This is beneficial from an economic point of view as consumers get 
value from new products. However, as the number of IP rights increases, it is possible 
that the licensing process can become ‘congested’, resulting in increased costs and 
inefficiencies. We can distinguish three costs that congestion may impose on the 
development of cumulative innovations or downstream products that combine multiple 
innovations. 
 
First, downstream users of IP will face increasing search costs as it becomes more time-
consuming and difficult to identify relevant existing IP rights. Second, if relevant IP 
rights exist, licenses will need to be negotiated. Since negotiating licenses can be 
complex and expensive, the more licenses that need to be negotiated, the greater the 
transaction costs innovators and licensors will face. Third, if a new innovation or product 
needs access to multiple complementary IP rights, the tragedy of the anti-commons (Heller 
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Consumer expenditure   8 
among upstream IP owners result in the total fee charged to downstream users being 
excessively high. 
 
Search and transaction costs and the tragedy of the anti-commons affect economic 
outcomes in the market for technology. The costs of licensing and the license fees that 
arise in the market for technology determine, together with downstream demand, the 
downstream uses that are economically viable, and the prices charged to final users. 
This determines economic welfare and the distribution of welfare among consumers, 
producers and innovators. In addition, innovators will base their decisions about 
whether to invest in research and development and whether to license their innovations 
at least partially on expectations of licensing revenues. Thus the final economic 
outcomes feed back into the incentives to innovate. Figure 5 summarizes these effects. 
 
Figure 5 Linkages between conditions in the market for technology and economic outcomes. 
 
 
Of the three adverse effects of IP proliferation that we have identified, increasing search 
and transaction costs are easy to understand. Both increase the cost of downstream uses 
of innovations. If these costs could be avoided or reduced, then the downstream 
activities would be cheaper, and the resources saved could be put to alternative uses, 
resulting in productive efficiency gains. In addition, if the search and/or transaction 
costs for a particular downstream use are too large, the project may become unviable 
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outcomes   9 
The third effect, the tragedy of the anti-commons, needs some further explanation. 
Suppose that licenses to two existing complementary technologies, A and B, are required 
to produce a third technology, C. The producers of C must pay royalties rA and rB to the 
owners of the patents on A and B for each unit of C that is sold. Assume there are no 
other costs of producing C aside from the royalties. Assume also that C is competitively 
supplied, so that its price equals its marginal cost, which is rA + rB. In this situation, an 
increase in either rA or rB will increase the per-unit cost (and hence the price) of C and 
will result in fewer units of C being sold.  
 
The tragedy of the anti-commons arises in this situation because the owner of the patent 
on A, for example, will not account for the fact that an increase in rA reduces the royalty 
revenues received by the owner of patent on B, since fewer units of C will be sold when 
rA increases. In other words, the choice of rA by the owner of the patent on A imposes an 
externality on the owner of the patent on B, and vice versa. This means that the total 
royalty per unit of C, rA + rB, will end up being too high from the point of view of 
maximizing the joint royalty revenues. On the other hand, if the royalties were set by the 
patent holders in cooperation to maximize their joint revenues then the externalities 
would be internalized. The total royalty per unit of C would be lower but total royalty 
revenues higher than when the royalties are set independently. Since this would also 
mean a lower price of C, it makes the consumers of C better off as well. In a more 
general example, it is also possible to show that the total royalty that results when IP 
owners act independently increases with the number of IP owners. In other words, the 
more property rights that bear upon a downstream use, the worse is the tragedy of the 
anti-commons. 
 
From a static efficiency point of view, production of the new innovation C will be 
inefficiently low when royalties are set independently. The tragedy of the anticommons 
may also generate dynamic efficiency losses. If the creation of C requires fixed costs 
(such as further research and development), this will only be undertaken if the profits 
from selling C are expected to exceed these costs. If the total royalty payments to A and 
B are too high, C may not be produced at all. 
 
Note that cooperative determination of the royalties is only beneficial if A and B are 
complementary. Suppose instead that A and B are perfect substitutes. In this case, the 
producers of C will simply choose whichever has the lowest royalty and competition 
between A and B will force royalties down to the lowest level that just covers their 
research and development costs. If, however, the owners of the rights to A and B jointly 
set their royalties, they could collude to undermine this competitive process and 
increase their profits. This would be beneficial for them, but it would hurt consumers of 
C as the price of C would rise. It can be shown that this outweighs the gains of the   10 
patent owners, and so economic efficiency reduces. Therefore, cooperation in setting 
royalties is only desirable when the technologies are complements, not substitutes. More 
general cases where patents are neither perfect substitutes nor perfect complements are 
analyzed by Lerner and Tirole (2004), who give specific conditions under which patent 
pools are efficiency-enhancing, in terms of the degree of complementarity of the patents. 
 
To summarize, a proliferation of IP rights increases search and transaction costs for 
downstream uses. In addition, for uses that rely on licenses to complementary 
technologies, the tragedy of the anti-commons may result in inefficiently high license 
fees.4 Any of these effects potentially result in both static and dynamic efficiency losses. 
 
3  Description and Classification of IP Access Systems 
In this section we describe some of the IP access systems that exist in response to the 
problems outlined in the previous section. As discussed in the introduction, we focus on 
systems that can be centralized for operation by a third-party: patent pools and IP 
clearinghouses. We consider four types of IP clearinghouse, of which one type 
encompasses collective rights management organizations such as copyright collectives.  
 
The basic role played by an IP access system in the process of innovation is illustrated in 
Figure 6, which shows where IP access systems fit in the framework of Figure 4. In the 
absence of a system, IP is licensed in a decentralized manner, with innovators and users 
of IP finding each other and making licensing arrangements independently. When an IP 
access system exists, it provides a “platform” that facilitates interactions between 
innovators and IP users.  
 
Different IP access systems can be distinguished along a number of dimensions. The 
important dimensions are shown in Figure 7. Systems may be collectives that satisfy a 
joint objective of the member IP owners, or third-parties with their own objectives. This 
may be profit maximization, or some other objective such as efficient cost recovery for 
non-profit systems. The systems may also be relatively open or closed in terms of their 
admission of different IP rights, and may just provide information about IP, or may 
provide both information and licenses. We will discuss the differences between systems 
in terms of these dimensions. 
                                                     
4 Some authors use the term ‘anticommons’ to refer to what we have called the tragedy of the 
anticommons as well as increased search and transaction costs. In this paper we will always refer 
to the tragedy of the anticommons and search and transaction costs separately. In addition, under 
our definition, the tragedy of the anticommons is exactly the mirror image of the well-known 
tragedy of the commons.    11 
 
Figure 6 Basic function of an IP access system in the market for technology. 
 
 
Figure 7 Key dimensions that distinguish IP access systems. 
Ownership  Objective  Entry of IP  Function 
Third-party  Profit/Revenue 
Maximization  Open  Information Only 
Collective  Cost Recovery / 
Other  Restricted  Information & 
Licensing 
 
3.1  Patent Pools 
A patent pool is an arrangement between two or more patent holders in which the 
relevant patents are licensed jointly as a package. The licensees may be the patent 
holders themselves, other users of the technology, or both. Patent pools are often based 
around a specific technology or standard. Obtaining a single license from the pool 
means that the licensee has access to all of the IP covered by the patents in the pool and 
standardized licenses are typically offered to anyone who wants one. Recent examples 
include the MPEG-2 (video encoding) and 3G (mobile telecommunications) pools.5 In 
information technology industries, formation of a pool around a common technological 
standard is relatively straightforward, and it is possible to identify which patents are 
essential to the standard. In biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, pool formation may be 
                                                     





Supply of innovations 






Supply of innovations 























   12 
more difficult as technical standards are harder to define precisely. Some working 
examples include the ‘Golden rice’ and SARS pools.6 
 
It is common for patent pools to be either administered by a management organization 
on behalf of the members, or by one or more of the members of the pool on behalf of all 
members. For example, the MPEG 2 pool (currently 23 members) is administered by the 
independent MPEG-LA organization, while the DVD3C and DVD6C pools are 
administered by Philips and Toshiba respectively (Aoki, 2005). One of the key 
administrative functions is to determine which patents are admitted to the pool. Patent 
pools are quite restrictive regarding the IP that is admitted. This stems from anti-trust 
concerns. As explained above, patent pools are efficiency enhancing provided that the 
patents within the pool are sufficiently complementary in nature. However, pools of 
patents that are sufficiently substitutable are anti-competitive and allow the member 
firms to increase profits at the expense of users of the patents. Therefore, membership of 
a patent pool is usually restricted to those patents that are deemed to be ‘essential’ to the 
pool. To satisfy anti-trust authorities, patent pools often employ independent experts to 
assess essentiality. 
 
3.2  IP Clearinghouses 
The idea of an IP clearinghouse has recently been discussed by a number of authors to 
address the economic inefficiencies identified above that arise from a proliferation of IP 
rights.7 A clearinghouse is like a middleman in the market for technology that facilitates 
exchanges between IP owners and IP users. Its scope is broader than a patent pool and it 
may have independent objectives. For example, a biotechnology clearinghouse could 
provide a database of biotechnology patents and allow searching and identification of IP 
owners. The clearinghouse could also facilitate licensing and handle the collection of 
royalties and monitoring of uses on behalf of the patent holders. In principle, the 
clearinghouse could raise revenues from both IP owners and IP users for its services.  
 
The nature of a clearinghouse means that they are generally administered by third-party 
organizations and not by one or more members. A key question is whether or not the 
clearinghouse acts on behalf of the member IP owners. Copyright collectives are 
administered by third-party organizations that operate on behalf of the members of the 
collective. For example, the American Society of Composers and Performers (ASCAP) is 
                                                     
6 See Verbeure et al (2006) for a summary of these pools and a discussion of issues relating to the 
formation of patent pools in medical diagnostic testing.  
7 See van Zimmeren et al (2006), Van Overwalle et al (2006), Krattinger (2004), OECD (2002), Graff 
& Zilberman (2001) and Dequiedt et al (2007).   13 
administered as a voluntary association by a board of directors elected by the members.8 
In contrast, as we will see, other clearinghouses often operate as independent entities, 
with their own objectives. 
 
In terms of classification, five different types of clearinghouse are distinguished by van 
Zimmeren et al (2006), depending on the functions performed. These range from an 
‘informational’ clearinghouse that merely facilitates access to information about IP, 
through to a ‘royalty collection’ clearinghouse that provides information, as well as 
standardized licenses plus royalty monitoring and collection functions. This taxonomy is 
useful in that it distinguishes the range of different functions that a clearinghouse may 
perform. In our view, the most important functional distinction is whether or not the 
clearinghouse provides licenses to IP users directly. We distinguish two functional types 
of clearinghouse: an informational clearinghouse and a licensing clearinghouse. The former 
collects and provides access to information about existing IP. The latter provides 
information and also sells licenses directly, and may perform royalty collection functions.  
 
Of the other dimensions identified in Figure 7, ownership of the clearinghouse is 
another important point of classification. Ownership will affect the incentives of a 
clearinghouse when setting the prices (if any) that it charges for its services, and the 
royalties that it sets, if applicable. The incentives of the clearinghouse will be very 
different if it is operated as a collective, compared to if it is an independent third-party. 
Overall, we distinguish four different types of clearinghouse as shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 Classification of intellectual property clearinghouses. 
3



























Copyright collectives are examples of collective licensing clearinghouses (type IV). 
These collectives, such as ASCAP, Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI), and the Japan 
Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers (JASRAC), are similar to patent 
                                                     
8 See www.ascap.com/about/.    14 
pools in that they provide licenses to packages of IP. Aside from the fact that they apply 
to copyrights rather than patents, the main feature that distinguishes copyright 
collectives from patent pools is their scope. A license from a copyright collective 
typically permits the use of a wide range of copyrighted material, whereas patent pools 
are limited to a particular technology or standard. The collectives then monitor which 
works are performed and apportion the total revenues less operating expenses to the 
copyright owners in accordance with a set formula.  
 
An example of a third-party IP clearinghouse is BirchBob,9 which facilitates exchanges 
between the technology transfer offices of universities and other research institutions 
with firms that would like to use and license new technologies. In terms of the 
classification in Figure 8 it is a type I clearinghouse and provides an online searchable 
database of IP. BirchBob describes itself as an ‘innovation agency’ that assists innovators 
with commercializing and licensing their technologies, however it does not sell licenses 
directly, thus we do not classify it as a licensing clearinghouse. 
 
Other examples include the Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture 
(PIPRA)10 and general patent search services such as the Google patent search.11 The 
Google patent search allows online searching of the full text of the more than seven 
million patents issued by the USPTO since the 1790s, using specialized text search 
technology developed by Google. Google does not charge users for searching its 
database, nor patent holders for being listed, but instead earns revenues indirectly 
through advertising on its website. It is another example of a third-party informational 
clearinghouse (type I). PIPRA is a non-profit organization that aims to encourage 
agricultural development by facilitating access to relevant IP. It currently does this 
mainly by providing a database of relevant patents. Thus it is another type I 
clearinghouse, although it is non-profit. PIPRA also states that it has aims to create 
packages of complementary agricultural IP and license these to users.12 If it does so, it 
would become a type II clearinghouse. 
 
In contrast with patent pools, clearinghouses (including copyright collectives) are quite 
open in terms of the IP that they admit. For example, it is possible to join BMI online 
very easily, at no cost.13 BirchBob and Yet2.com also permit listings of technologies by 
anyone who pays a set fee. This may be explained because the value of a clearinghouse 
increases as more IP is admitted, everything else equal (see section 4.2 below). The only 
                                                     
9 See www.birchbob.com.  
10 See van Zimmeren et al (2006) for a summary.  
11 www.google.com/patents/ 
12 See www.pipra.org/main/activities.htm#3.  
13 See www.bmi.com/join/.    15 
restriction typically encountered is with specialized clearinghouses that concentrate on a 
particular subject matter, such as PIPRA.  
 
As explained above, copyright collectives fall into type IV in our classification of 
clearinghouses. We are not aware of any type II or III clearinghouses that currently exist. 
In principle, third-party licensing clearinghouses (type II) could operate in a similar 
fashion to copyright collectives. We are also not aware of any type IV clearinghouse that 
provides access to patents, and the complexity of writing standardized licenses for 
patented innovations is suggested by van Zimmeren et al (2006) as a possible 
explanation for this.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the type I clearinghouses that we have been able to identify. We 
have separated them into two groups. The first, IP database search engines, provide 
either free or subscription services that permit searching of one or more databases of IP. 
The second group, IP exchange platforms, may provide database search services, but 
also permit IP owners with licensable technologies (consisting of one or more patented 
innovations) to advertise and permit IP users to search these advertisements. Thus the 
second group allows IP owners to take a more active role in their use of the 
clearinghouse. Some of these exchange platforms, such as BirchBob and Yet2.com also 
assist with licensing negotiations by providing consulting services. 
   16 
Table 2 Third-party informational clearinghouses (type I) that we have identified. 
Pricing 
Name  Website  Field  Included IP  Information 
Sources  Search  Advertising 
IP Database Search Engines 
CAMBIA 
Patent Lens*  patentlens.net  General  Patents  Patent 
databases  Free  N/A 
Delphion 
Research  delphion.com  General  Patents  Patent 




patents  General  Patents  USPTO 
filings  Free  N/A 
PatentCafe  patentcafe.com  General  Patents  Patent 
databases  Subscription  N/A 
PIPRA*  pipra.org  Agriculture  Patents  Patent 
databases  Free  N/A 
Thomson 




IP databases  Subscription  N/A 
Thomson 
MicroPatent  micropat.com  General  Patents  Patent 




pharma.com  Pharma  Patents  Patent 
databases  Subscription  N/A 
WIPO Digital 





database  Free  N/A 
IP Exchange Platforms 
BirchBob  birchbob.com  General  Licensable 




com  General  Licensable 
technologies  Submissions  Free  Per-listing fee 
MVS 
Solutions  mvssolutions.net  General  Licensable 








technologies  Submissions  Subscription  Subscription 







Subscription  Free 










* Operates on a non-profit basis. 
 
4  Comparing the Economic Features of IP Access Systems 
In this section we discuss and compare the essential economic features of different IP 
access systems. We are interested in the effect on economic outcomes illustrated in 
Figure 5 in the context of the framework from Figure 4. In general this depends on (i) the 
incentives of the system, which in turn depends on whether the system is a collective or 
independent third party, and (ii) the scope that the system has for realizing efficiency 
gains in terms of reducing search and transaction costs and solving the tragedy of the   17 
anticommons. We also discuss the role that ‘network’ effects play in the system’s 
operation, and factors determining a system’s stability. 
4.1  The Economic Value of IP Access Systems 
As illustrated in Figure 6, all systems provide a ‘platform’ that facilitates licensing 
arrangements, and reduce search and transaction costs in the licensing process. For 
example, a user of a technology covered by a patent pool need not worry about the 
specific IP rights contained within the pool. This reduces the licensee’s costs because it 
only needs to identify and negotiate with the pool, rather than all members individually. 
Similarly, an access agreement with a licensing clearinghouse such as a copyright 
collective immediately identifies exactly which IP can be used under the agreement. 
Informational clearinghouses may also give users the ability to search for existing IP 
more efficiently than they could through independent search, if the scale of the 
clearinghouse allows it to deploy a more effective search technology. For example, 
Google’s patent search technology is arguably more effective than what most small-scale 
licensees could implement independently. This is because aggregation of the search 
function into a single entity means that more sophisticated and expensive search 
technologies can be employed as the costs can be recovered from a broader base of users.  
 
In terms of transaction costs, patent pools and licensing clearinghouses can create value 
by exploiting economies of scale in licensing and negotiation. If a product or 
downstream innovation requires licenses to N existing innovations and there are M 
potential licensees, then N×M licensing arrangements must be made in the absence of an 
IP access system. Even if each licensor offers standardized licenses, there are still a 
potentially large number of transactions that must occur when the innovation is 
complex (N is large) and/or there are many licensees (M is large). In comparison, 
suppose that with an IP access system, each licensor and each licensee makes a single 
agreement with the system. In this case there are N + M agreements that must be made. 
The access system reduces the number of agreements that need to be made if N + M < 
N×M, or if M > N / (N – 1), that is, if the number of licensees is sufficiently large relative 
to the number of licensors. There may be additional savings if the system offers 
standardized licenses, compared to if each licensor has to write its own license 
agreement.  
 
In addition, the marginal cost of adding an extra licensee to the system does not change 
with the number of licensors that use the system (the marginal cost of increasing M does 
not depend on N). In contrast, with bilateral negotiations, the marginal cost of increasing 
M is higher the greater is N. These reduced costs are likely to mean that there will be 
greater entry of licensees under an IP access system, which will mean increased   18 
competition in the market for the final good or service that is being produced, further 
enhancing economic efficiency. 
 
In the case of complementary IP, an IP access system may also create value by 
internalizing the externalities that lead to the tragedy of the anticommons, if license fees 
are set centrally. In effect, joint setting of license fees aggregates the multiple 
overlapping IP rights into a single right, which eliminates the source of the tragedy of 
the anti-commons. However, as was shown, this does not hold true when the IP rights 
are substitutes. Thus it is more difficult to say in general whether licensing 
clearinghouses including copyright collectives that set license fees centrally would 
improve economic efficiency by mitigating the tragedy of the anticommons. It would 
depend on the particular mix of IP that is included in the system, but in general if a 
broad range of IP is included then the individual rights are more likely to be substitutes 
rather than complements. 
 
In summary, all IP access systems improve economic efficiency by reducing search and 
transaction costs. This reduces the cost of downstream innovation and developing new 
products based on combinations of existing IP. Patent pools can further improve 
efficiency if the member patents are sufficiently complementary. However, by their 
nature of incorporating a broad range of IP, it is less likely that the IP available through 
a licensing clearinghouse such as a copyright collective will be sufficiently 
complementary that joint license fee setting will be efficiency enhancing. Nevertheless, 
such clearinghouses can still be desirable, if there is a net gain in economic efficiency 
due to reduced costs.  
4.2  Incentives of the System 
The extent to which the potential efficiency gains of an IP access system are realized 
depend in part on its own incentives. The incentives of the system determine the prices 
that it charges to its customers – downstream users and/or IP owners – for the services 
that it provides. The crucial question is whether the system operates on behalf of a 
group of licensors, or whether it is a truly independent third-party. In the former case, 
the system will seek to achieve the goal of the licensors, such as maximization of their 
joint revenues. If it is a third-party then its objective may be to maximize its own profit, 
or some other objective if it is a non-profit entity. 
 
Patent pools and type III and IV clearinghouses such as copyright collectives operate in 
the interests of the members who have contributed IP. Typically, any revenues earned 
by the pool or collective are redistributed to members according to some formula, minus 
the cost of administrative expenses. For example, ASCAP states that its objective is to 
“maximize payments to members”, and claims that it redistributes 88% of its revenues   19 
to members.14 Similarly, the royalties received from patent pool licenses such as those 
sold by MPEG-LA and the DVD pools are redistributed to the members of the pool. In 
contrast, third-party clearinghouses (type I and II) operate according to their own 
objectives. The profit-making informational clearinghouses (type I) in Table 2 revenue 
directly or indirectly from either of these two groups. For example, Yet2.com raises 
revenues by charging subscription fees and/or commissions to both IP owners and IP 
users for its services.  
 
The other factor affecting the system’s incentives is the ‘demand’ that it faces. Since the 
value of an IP access system comes from the licensing platform that it provides to IP 
owners and downstream users, the demand that the system faces is likely to be 
characterized by ‘network’ effects. The demand for a good or service exhibits network 
effects when it becomes more valuable to its consumers the greater the number of 
people who consume it. This has important implications for the behavior of firms and 
market outcomes. Consumer expectations become important, and different levels of 
demand can be supported at a given price depending on whether expectations about the 
uptake of the good or service are optimistic or pessimistic (see the discussion on stability 
below). Markets with network effects also often ‘tip’ towards one good or service and 
tend to be characterized by a single dominant firm at any one point in time, and inferior 
products may be able to survive longer than they otherwise would in the face of 
superior competition.  
 
In the general case of an IP access platform as illustrated in Figure 6, these network 
effects operate across the platform. That is, there are two distinct groups that the 
platform serves: IP owners and IP users. Each group would like to join a platform that 
has more of the other type using the same platform. Specifically, IP owners would like to 
join a platform that has more IP users, everything else equal, because this will increase 
the royalties that they expect to receive. Similarly, IP users would like to join a platform 
that has more IP owners, everything else equal, because it gives access to a greater range 
of IP that can be exploited. That is, a general IP access system operates what has become 
known as a ‘two-sided platform’ (Rochet & Tirole 2003, 2006, Caillaud & Jullien 2003). 
 
However, this observation that does not apply to the specific cases of patent pools and 
collective clearinghouses (types III and IV) such as copyright collectives, due to the way 
that these systems operate. First, a patent pool serves the interests of its members. The 
pool itself does not seek to earn any revenues from patent holders, and therefore only 
targets one side of the market – the IP users. Admission to the pool is also not based on 
willingness to pay a price, but rather an assessment of essentiality. Conceptually, pools 
                                                     
14 See www.ascap.com/about/payment/paymentintro.html.   20 
do not exist independent of patent holders and do not seek to attract patent holders to 
raise revenue. Rather, pools are formed by the patent holders themselves.  
 
Collective clearinghouses such as copyright collectives are similar to patent pools in that 
they exist to maximize the joint royalty revenues of the members, and do not raise 
revenues from members. As with a patent pool, a collective clearinghouse is not a two-
sided platform because it operates on behalf of one side of the market, rather than 
seeking to raise revenues from both sides. However, collective clearinghouses do exhibit 
network effects. As discussed above, the collective promotes more efficient access by the 
users to the IP held in the collective. A collective with more works will therefore be more 
valuable to users than a smaller collective, everything else equal. Similarly, joining a 
collective will be more attractive to an IP owner if more IP users get licenses from the 
collective, as the amount of royalties that the IP owner expects to receive will increase.  
 
Unlike patent pools and collective clearinghouses, third-party clearinghouses are 
examples of two-sided platforms. Such a clearinghouse can raise revenues from both IP 
owners and IP users, and seeks to maximize its own profits, rather than the joint royalty 
revenues of the IP owners. As has been discussed in the literature, operating a two-sided 
platform is more complex than a firm that produces a single product or that produces 
multiple but unrelated products. A two-sided platform must consider the demands on 
both sides of the market simultaneously when making its pricing decisions. This is 
because an increase in the price charged to one group, for example, will reduce the 
number of members of the platform from that group, which will then affect the 
willingness to pay of the other group, via the cross-platform network effect. Two-sided 
platforms also face the same problem that all network businesses face in that since the 
value of the platform partially or completely comes from network effects, it may be 
difficult to get established, particularly if IP right owners and users have pessimistic 
expectations about the likely success of the platform.   
4.3  Stability 
A final important economic consideration is the stability of the different systems. Instead 
of participating in an IP access system, any IP owner can choose to be an ‘outsider’ and 
license his or her IP to users directly. The incentives for IP owners to join or remain in a 
system are therefore crucial in determining the ability of the system to get off the ground 
in the first place, and its ongoing stability once it is established. Stability and formation 
of collectives are related, but not exactly the same problem.  
 
For clearinghouses, including copyright collectives, there is likely to be a tendency 
towards stability, due to the network effects among IP owners (Aoki, 2006). Given that 
other IP owners are members of the clearinghouse, any individual IP owner’s incentive   21 
is to belong, rather than becoming an outsider. Such stability of clearinghouses is partly 
evidenced by the longevity of copyright collectives such as ASCAP (established in 1914) 
and BMI (established in 1939).  However as mentioned above there is a possibility of 
multiple equilibria: there can be an equilibrium with many members and another one 
with very small membership at the same membership price. If there are few members, 
there are few people that find it worthwhile to join which keeps membership small. A 
small membership equilibrium can be stable and there is no endogenous way to move 
between equilibria. Guaranteeing a large membership equilibrium requires some kind of 
intervention by the clearinghouse (Aoki, 2006).  
 
The issue of stability and formation is more critical for patent pools. Recall that patent 
pools solve the tragedy of the anticommons problem by internalizing the externalities 
that exist among pool members. However, this same mechanism means that any 
individual pool member has an incentive to become an outsider and ‘free ride’ on the 
pool, at least when royalties are distributed to members in proportion to the number of 
patents that they contribute to the pool (Aoki, 2005, 2006). In other words, the same 
reason that makes patent pools valuable also makes them unstable. Starting from the 
royalty level that is optimal for the pool (i.e. the level that maximizes joint royalties), any 
individual member would prefer to leave the pool and set a higher royalty for its 
patent(s). Since an outsider would not choose the pool royalty level, it implies that an 
outsider could make more profits, given that all others remain in the pool. Therefore, 
each member has a unilateral incentive to leave the pool once it is formed, which 
undermines the pool’s stability.  This same principle also gives a patent holder an 
incentive to hold out and refuse to join the pool after the pool has become a certain size. 
Furthermore, a rational patent holder will correctly expect a pool of some size to form 
and refuse to join from the very beginning.  
 
Instability of patent pools can also arise from heterogeneity among members. If some 
members are research-only firms while others are integrated research and 
manufacturing firms, then the marginal effect of a change in the pool royalty on these 
two types of firms is different. This is because the royalty affects only revenues for a 
research firm, but both revenues and costs for an integrated firm. This means that 
research-only firms generally prefer to remain outsiders rather than joining a pool with 
integrated firms, unless the research firms receive disproportionately higher royalty 
payments (Aoki & Nagaoka, 2004, Aoki, 2006). This also implies that research firms need 
disproportionately more inducement to join a pool at the formation stage. Binding 
agreements and ‘punishments’ for exiting the pool may also be necessary.  
 
Additional problems may arise in the process of pool formation, due to the fact that 
smaller pools consisting of only some of the essential patents may have an incentive to   22 
block the formation of a larger pool of all essential patents. In particular, using 
cooperative game theory Aoki and Nagaoka (2005) show that if the number of firms 
with essential patents is large enough, a smaller pool consisting of only some essential 
patents makes its members better off than the absence of a pool, and that the members of 
the smaller pool would be made worse off if additional members were admitted. This 
may explain why patent pools are less common than they otherwise would be, or that 
some pools do not include all essential IP and thus do not achieve the maximum benefits 
of pool formation.  
 
However we observe that some pools have indeed formed. Schiff and Aoki (2007) 
examine pool formation by competing consortium standards. They show that if there is 
another standard that competes, in some cases this can increase incentives for pool 
formation. The pools that have formed do not always have a competing standard but it 
could be that threat or potential emergence of a competing standard had been enough 
for pool formation.  However there are also some cases where patent owners find it 
more profitable not to form a pool when standards compete, because not pooling is a 
way for a standard to commit to setting a high total royalty, which may be desirable 
when in competition with another standard.  
 
5  Conclusion 
In this paper we have reviewed patent pools and IP clearinghouses (including copyright 
collectives) as systems that promote access to IP. These promote downstream uses of IP 
such as cumulative innovation and the development of products based on multiple 
innovations by reducing search and transaction costs, and help to solve the tragedy of 
the anticommons that occurs with complementary IP. Each system has different features 
and each is more suitable in certain situations. Patent pools are ideal in situations where 
complementary patents must be combined to produce a new product or innovation and 
the essential patents are easy to identify. This reduces transaction and search costs for 
licensors and licensees, and mitigates the tragedy of the anticommons. The 
disadvantages of patent pools are that they are generally limited in scope by antitrust 
concerns, and they can be difficult to set up and maintain stability especially when there 
is heterogeneity among the pool members. 
 
Collective clearinghouses such as copyright collectives have worked well to reduce the 
costs of licensing and monitoring the use of copyrighted works. Copyright collectives 
contain a much broader range of IP than patent pools. Due to network effects, we expect 
that copyright collectives are inherently more stable than patent pools. However, 
copyright collectives have come under some scrutiny as collectives set license fees 
centrally, and many of the works in a collection are likely to be substitutes.   23 
 
Other third-party clearinghouses dealing mainly in patents are a relatively new 
phenomenon, due to the reduced costs of collecting and disseminating information over 
the Internet. The existing third-party clearinghouses do not sell licenses directly, but 
provide a ‘matching service’ of varying degrees of sophistication between IP owners and 
users. This economizes on search and transaction costs, but without centralized licensing 
cannot solve the tragedy of the anticommons problem. Third-party clearinghouses 
usually operate as independent profit-maximizing firms, and so have an incentive to 
maximize the economies of scale in licensing and negotiation that they can generate. 
Third-party clearinghouses also exhibit network effects, which flow across the platform 
that they provide, and make them an example of a two-sided platform, with relatively 
complex pricing problems. 
 
In terms of future economic research, our overview of these different systems raises a 
number of interesting questions. First, a better understanding of the economics of third-
party IP clearinghouses is needed. It would be useful to apply the lessons of the two-
sided markets literature to this type of platform. One possible complication is that the 
two sides of the market are not always clearly separated in the case of IP, as licensors are 
often also licensees. It would be also interesting to compare directly the economic 
incentives of a third-party clearinghouse versus a collective clearinghouse. 
Of further interest would be a more detailed comparison of the economic aspects of the 
different systems in terms of their effects on reducing costs of cumulative innovation 
and product development, and in solving the tragedy of the anticommons. Ultimately, a 
consistent framework within which the different systems can be compared is needed. 
Using such a framework, the effects of the different types of system on innovation and 
welfare could be assessed, which may lead to more specific policy recommendations.  
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